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Abstract—The smart grid, as the next generation of the power grid, is characterized by employing many different types of intelligent
devices, such as intelligent electronic devices located at substations, smart meters positioned in the home area network, and outdoor
field equipment deployed in the fields. Also, there are various users in the smart grid network, including customers, operators,
maintenance personnel, and etc., who use these devices for various purposes. Therefore, a secure and efficient mutual authentication
and authorization scheme is needed in the smart grid to prevent various insider and outsider attacks on many different devices. In this
paper, we propose an authentication and authorization scheme for mitigating outsider and insider threats in the smart grid by verifying
the user authorization and performing the user authentication together whenever a user accesses the devices. The proposed scheme
computes each user-role dynamically using an attribute-based access control and verifies the identity of user together with the device.
Security and performance analysis show that the proposed scheme resists various insider as well as outsider attacks, and is more
efficient in terms of communication and computation costs in comparison with the existing schemes. The correctness of the proposed
scheme is also proved using BAN-Logic and Proverif.
Index Terms—Smart Grid, Authentication, Authorization, Insider Threat, Security.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE smart grid (SG) is a future opportunistic platform forensuring electrical power transmission and distribution
in a reliable, secure, and efficient manner. However, there
are many evolving challenges in the smart grid security.
Many SG security challenges have focused on protecting
the system against various forms of external (outsider)
cyber-attacks, including man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks,
intrusion-based attacks, malware-based attacks, denial of
service (DoS) attacks, isolated attacks, and coordinated at-
tacks [1]. Although known external attacks have been pro-
tected by well-known practices, a severe threat that modern
critical infrastructures are newly facing is an insider threat
or an insider attack. An insider threat is a user who has
appropriate permissions to access required resources of the
system and misuses its privileges. For smart grid hav-
ing many integrated components and user groups, insider
threats can influence the system massively. Insider threats
can compromise many of the security goals of the system.
They can compromise integrity by modifying data without
authorization, availability by creating delays where low
latency is required (4 milliseconds for protective relaying,
few seconds for feeding data to supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA), data transmission to substations and
wide area monitoring messages, few minutes for monitoring
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equipment and market pricing information, and few hours
for smart meter (SM) reading), confidentiality by exposing
privacy of customer information and some part of electric
market information, and accountability by avoiding liability
and responsibility [2]. In fact, such insider threats can influ-
ence the security level of the SG system from low to high [3].
Hence, the countermeasures must address outsider as well
as insider attacks.
In the advance metering infrastructure (AMI) system of
the smart grid, the insider attacks can be performed at the
customer endpoint as well as at the opposite end of the AMI
system. Smart meters generally have some connectivity to
the AMI head end, but this connectivity may be as slow as
1200 baud, or lower [3]. Consequently, the insider attacker
can get access to modify meter readings and can view pri-
vate information of the customer at the customer endpoint.
Similarly, insider attacker may be able to access the electric-
ity price information, network infrastructure information,
and other information communicated by protocols. Some of
these systems and protocols are energy management system
(EMS), distributed network protocol (DNP3), inter-control
center communications protocol (ICCP), and open smart
grid protocol (OSGP). The EMS enables transmission of real-
time information, such as grid’s status, remote automation
of grid functionalities, and etc. The OSGP provides reliable
and efficient delivery of command and control information
among various smart grid devices, including smart me-
ters, control modules, and gateways. The DNP3 is used by
SCADA master stations (control centers (CC)), and the ICCP
is used for inter-master station communications.
To provide authentication and authorization of users,
the intelligent electronic devices (IED), smart meters, and
outdoor field equipment (OFE) (e.g., pole-top devices, such
as recloser) use various local passwords. Several passwords
allow different user-roles to access the device for various
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purposes. These role-based passwords are generally shared
among various users accessing devices, and due to a large
number of devices, these passwords are often the same
across all devices in the utility and seldom change [3].
User authentication and authorization are challenging due
to the fact that these devices may be accessed physically
on-site as well as remotely through wired (optical)/wireless
(from different locations). There may also be various types
of users, such as employees (EMP), vendor engineers (VE),
maintenance personnel (MP), security officer (SO) etc., and
various types of roles like auditor (read), employee (read-
write), administrator (add-modify-delete), maintenance per-
sonnel (read), and etc. Since each role has a different pass-
word, the system can recognize the role of a user, but, it
cannot identify which user (name or identity) is trying to
access the system. Table 1 and Table 2 outline the access
behavior of different devices and access permissions for
different user-roles, respectively. In this paper, in order to
better explain our problem, we consider a specific user-
role, i.e., maintenance personnel. Note that the maintenance
personnel role can be extended to any other user-role, such
as customer, vendor engineer, contractor, and etc.
According to the NIST report [4], one of the crucial chal-
lenges in the future smart grid is to authenticate and autho-
rize users (such as maintenance personnel) whenever they
access IED/SM/OFE located at substations/homes/fields in
such a way that the resource access is specific to a user,
the user specific authentication information is not shared
among users, e.g., identity and password, and the control of
authentication and authorization is hierarchically managed
by substations (SS) and the utility’s central station (C).
This ensures that only authenticated users can perform the
assigned authorized actions onto the intended devices in a
controlled and scalable manner. Therefore, mutual authen-
tications between the user and the substation’s server to ac-
cess different devices with a specific user-role authorization
is needed to mitigate insider attacks in the SG network.
Different from traditional networks, availability, in-
TABLE 1: Access Behavior of Different Devices
No. Device Name Access Behavior
1 Intelligent elec-
tronic device
Physically/remotely by wired/wireless
2 Smart meter Physically through optical port of SM,
remotely through AMI infrastructure or
HAN gateway
3 Outdoor field
equipment
Remotely through wired/short-range
radio (Bluetooth/802.11)
TABLE 2: Access Permissions for Different User Roles
No. User Role Department Access Permission
1 Employee Internal Read-write (RW)
2 Auditor Internal Read-only (R)
3 Vendor engineer External Read-write (RW)
4 Customer Customer Read-only (R)
5 Contractor External Read-only (R)
6 Maintenance
personnel
Maintenance Read-only (R)
7 Administrator Internal Add-modify-delete (AMD)
8 Security officer Internal Read-write-modify (RWM)
tegrity of information, and performance efficiency are criti-
cal requirements for infrastructure networks, such as smart
grid that must operate continuously and satisfy system
requirements under diverse operating conditions [5]. Fur-
thermore, unlike the traditional power grid system, where
a centralized and radial topology is used to generate and
deliver power from one end to the other ends, the smart
grid provides intelligent transmission and distribution au-
tomation in a decentralized environment [6]. Considering
these differences, authentication and authorization schemes
in the smart grid need to be specifically designed to achieve
critical requirements, such as availability and integrity of
information. Therefore, authenticating different entities and
verifying their authorization are required simultaneously
[7]. There are many schemes for the traditional networks [8],
such as remote authentication dial-in user service (RADIUS)
and Diameter protocols. However, These protocols do not
fit well in the smart grid network. It provides centralized
services and maintains a central database. However, the
smart grid requires decentralized solutions, as a single-
point-of-failure can massively affect the whole system. Fur-
thermore, RADIUS has poor scalability and uses the user
datagram protocol (UDP), which does not provide reliable
data transfer. This is not suitable for the smart grid where
the availability of information is critical for its operation.
Furthermore, Diameter is an authentication, authorization,
and accounting protocol that instead supports transmission
control protocol (TCP). However, Diameter implements peer
authentication between communication endpoints using
pre-shared keys, which raises key management issues, and
therefore not suitable for large systems like the smart grid.
Numerous challenges arise with the integration of cyber
and physical systems along with human behavior and reg-
ulatory policy. Some challenges are quite similar to those
of traditional networks, but involves more complex interac-
tions [9]. The smart grid system has various user-roles, such
as operator, vendor, engineer, administrator, etc., accessing
many different types of devices in its network, such as smart
meter, intelligent electronic device, etc., simultaneously. It
also has more strict delay and execution time requirements.
Whereas authentication and authorization are executed as
two separate processes in the traditional network , executing
them as one process is needed in the smart grid to handle
frequent authentications among billions of devices and dy-
namic user-role authorizations for a large number of users.
It can also reduce the total execution time, which can help to
make the system more efficient to achieve its performance
requirements.
In this paper, we propose a scheme that provides a
mutual authentication between the user and the server, and
a dynamic authorization for each user-role by computing
the attribute-based hash value. The authorization is main-
tained so that each user can perform only those actions
that are allowed under the access permissions granted to
it. Our scheme provides a two-factor authentication. First,
the authentication is performed by verifying the identity of
each user as well as the device in a batch with the signature
verification of each device at the server of the substation.
Then, a one-time password (OTP) is sent to the user’s mobile
phone in order to verify the actual user who is accessing
the device. A shared secret key is also generated between
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the user and the device for secure communication using the
bilinear pairing technique. Specifically, the contributions of
our scheme are identified as follows.
1. Simultaneously provides user authentication and au-
thorization for different devices. Hence, it reduces the need
of having separate systems for each type of device. It also
works for different types of users interacting with many
different types of devices in the smart grid.
2. Deals with both, the physical and the remote access
of the devices by dynamically computing the role of a user.
Any user (with a defined role) can interact with any device
anywhere with authentication and authorization within the
premises of the central station.
3. Does not use any shared passwords. If a shared
password is compromised, it can reveal the confidential in-
formation to the adversary. Further, an adversary cannot re-
trieve any information based on linkability among different
devices, as these devices store hash values corresponding to
each user-role. For each device, these values are different for
each user-role.
4. Improves the efficiency of the system by verifying the
signatures of the devices in a batch at the authentication
server of the substation. Also, computational overhead is
reduced, as each user needs to generate only a public key
pair (Y1mp , Y2mp ), and hash H1 each time it accesses a differ-
ent device. Other parameters remain the same. This scheme
provides two-factor authentication (one when substation’s
authentication server (ASss) verifies user identity from the
message received by the IED and other when an OTP is sent
to user’s mobile phone) that ensures valid user identifica-
tion even when temporary identity is compromised.
5. Defeats various outsider attacks as well as insider
attacks, including man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks,
impersonation attacks, integrity violations, attacks by cus-
tomer, known key attacks, and repudiation attacks. It also
prevents insider attacks where (i) a user accesses the device
with the credential of his/her friend or family member with-
out notifying him/her, and (ii) a rogue device is installed by
a legitimate engineer in the network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
discusses existing work on user authentication and autho-
rization in the smart grid. Section 3 outlines the communi-
cation, system, and attack models. Our proposed scheme
is described in Section 4. The security and performance
analysis of our scheme are discussed in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper. In addition, Table 3 describes
symbols used in this paper along with their sizes.
2 RELATED WORK
Recently, a lot of research has been done for securing the SG
network, including the device and network authentication
[10], [11], privacy preservation in AMI [12], vehicular-to-
grid (V2G) networks [13] and dynamic price management
[14], and attribute revocation in data aggregation [15], [16]
with attribute-based encryption scheme. Some literature
focuses on outsider attacks, such as cyber-physical attacks
[17], load altering attacks [18] and distribution attacks [19],
cyber security of substations [20], data attacks [21], false
data injection attacks [22], data integrity attacks [23], traffic
analysis attacks [24], man-in-the-middle attacks [25], DoS
TABLE 3: Symbols And Abbreviations
Symbol Description Size (bits)
AS/AS’/SSC Authentication server –
MP/UA Maintenance personnel/user agent –
SS Name of substation 128
Name Name of user 128
s/Si Signature of user 128
P Generator of group 128
ID Identity of user/device/substation 128
x Private key of user/device/server 128
Y1/Y2 Public key pair of user/device/server 128
K Secret shared key 128
SDP Secret device parameter 64
H() One-way hash function –
h/H Hash value 64
Role/cRole Role of user 64
mode Mode of access 16
location User/device location 32
department Department of user 16
T Timestamp 64
attacks [26], and etc. However, insider attacks in the SG
network, such as attacks by the customer, attacks by the op-
erators/maintenance personnel, and etc., have not been well
investigated. These possibilities exist, if the user/device
authentication and access control are weak or not provided.
Access control in the distributed system is more chal-
lenging, as the management of activities by a single central
authority might not be possible or could be more resource
demanding [27]. In a role-based access control (RBAC), there
is a specific role for each user or a set of users created
by the administrator for accessing the resources with the
specified permissions. There are some role-based access
control models for the SG network existing in the literature
that focus on the user-role-based authentication [28], [29].
However, role-based schemes are generally expensive to
implement and do not provide a real-time access control
in many situations, specifically when the user has dynamic
attributes, such as shift/job timing, location, time of the day,
and etc. In addition, device authentication mechanisms for
smart home area network [30], [31], SG network [32], SG
electric vehicle system [33], and AMI network [34] have
also been proposed by researchers. Authentication scheme
in [30] is based on a public-key cryptography using elliptic
curves over finite fields, every device shares a pair-wise
key with the center of trust in [31], and the homomorphic
keyed hash values are used in [32]. A contextual factor
based on physical connectivity in the grid with conven-
tional authentication factor in the challenge-response are
combined and implemented in [33] on NXP-ATOP with
ARM processor. Further, the scheme in [34] uses an ID-
based authentication and a PKI, which generates a huge
overhead and is expensive to implement. However, these
schemes do not deal with the user authentication in the SG
network. Recently, a multi-factor authentication for fragile
communications is proposed that provides authentication
service in a slow connection situation and when central
server is down. But the scheme needs additional smart cards
and biometric devices [35].
Furthermore, the key management among various users
and devices, and the communication protocol level security
are also necessary factors in order to provide stronger secu-
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Fig. 1: Smart grid system model consisting of various devices and users connected by communication networks.
rity to the system. In this direction, a scheme was proposed
that deals with key generation, revocation management and
share keys between devices, and secure transmission of
meter-reading data [36]. An encryption key management
technique based on certificateless public key cryptography
was proposed that provides end-to-end security in AMI, but
the approach generates a huge overhead [37]. An extension
of distributed network protocol (DNP3) to the DNP3 secure
authentication (SA) considers multiple users at the master
site [38]. This scheme presumes that both, the master station
and the substation, share a common secret key, which is
used to generate a session key. Furthermore, there exists
a substation-level authentication scheme in the literature
where IEDs and other resource-constrained devices can be
authenticated by any remote users with the help of the
substation controller (SSC) [39]. However, they considered
remote access of the IEDs using passwords shared among
users, lacking message integrity check, batch verification,
and prevention against replay attacks. Using the same pass-
word for each user-role to access all devices cannot support
verification of user identities. Instead of using public keys
for a huge number of handheld devices (HD), symmetric
keys using physical unclonable functions were proposed to
ensure a key agreement between the HD and the telemetric
devices under a scalable password changing protocol [41].
To the best of our knowledge, there is no such scheme in
the literature providing authentication and authorization for
various users accessing different devices in the SG system.
Our scheme tackles this challenging problem in this paper.
3 COMMUNICATION, SYSTEM, AND ATTACK MOD-
ELS
This section presents our communication and system model,
as well as attack model.
3.1 Communication and System Model
Consider a SG system model, including AMI infrastructure
network, as shown in Figure 1, where IEDs, SMs, and
OFEs are placed at different geographical locations under
different substations. These devices can be accessed by
different users, such as maintenance personnel (MP), vendor
engineer (VE), and security officer (SO) physically as well
as remotely. If a user accesses a device physically, then it
is assumed that the device provides an interface for the
integrity of information. Additionally, if a user accesses a
device remotely via wireless network, then it requires a
mechanism of integrity protection. There is a central authen-
tication server (ASc) stored at the control center (CC). This
ASc is connected with a number of substation servers (ASss),
each using a different pre-shared key. The communication
in our SG system is governed by the DNP3 or IEC 61850,
represented by Orange lines in Figure 1. A WAN/cellular
technology can be used in the wireless network.
As illustrated in Figure 2, in the existing problem, the
maintenance personnel MP1 and MP2 share a common
password PWMP , security officers SO1 and SO2 share a
secret password PWSO, vendor engineers VE1 and VE2
share a password PWV E , and so on. We propose a new
	
 

Fig. 2: Comparison of password matrix.
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password matrix where each password is replaced by a hash
value for a specific group of users. However, this hash value
is different for different devices placed at different locations.
There can be a number of central stations in a larger SG
network. However, in this paper, we consider one central
station directly connected with n-substations as shown in
Figure 3. The authentication server of each substation (ASss)
and its corresponding central station (ASc) can securely
communicate with each other using a pre-shared symmet-
ric key, and this is true for all substations. Substation-to-
substation communication is done only through the central
station. In this paper, for better understanding, we explain
our scheme considering a particular user-role named MP
and the IEDs as devices. Therefore, in our system, there are
n-MPs (MP1, MP2, ..., MPn) and m-devices (D1, D2, ..., Dm).
Each device must first compute a common secret key (say
a password) as computed by the user (say MP) in order to
provide a role-based user authorization. Each device must
verify the role of a user, and must perform authorization
and user verification. In our scheme, for each user-role, a
hash value is dynamically computed. For a specific group
of users, the hash value is different for different devices. In
addition, a session key is used between the user and the
device in order to maintain confidentiality of information.
3.2 Attack Model
Various security attacks (outsider and/or insider) are pos-
sible on SG network. An attacker may perform a man-
in-the-middle attack (outsider attack) by creating an active
connection between a user and a server, and makes them
believe that they are directly communicating with each
other by a secure connection over the SG network. The
attacker may delay or repeat the transmitted message to the
user or the server over the network resulting in a replay
attack. Also, an integrity violation can be performed by an
external attacker, if the attacker is successful at modifying
the transmitted messages over the SG network. An attacker
may also perform an impersonation attack where it tries to
impersonate the users involved in the SG system. Change of
security parameters can be done by both, insider and outsider
attackers. An unauthorized user may change the security
parameters of the SG system or the device in order to
gain access to it. Furthermore, the customer can tamper
with the smart meter and the AMI network to reduce the
cost of electricity usage. In addition, prevention against a
repudiation attack is one of the most important requirements,
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Fig. 3: Communication among various substations.
as even the higher authorities of the SG and AMI networks
can alter data and then later deny it. This attack can be
intentionally performed by an insider as well as an outsider.
There are many more attacks possible in the SG, including
attacks by consumers/operators/maintenance personnel. We also
address the insider attacks where an insider, accessing the
devices, can harm the system in the absence of proper
authentication and authorization.
4 PROPOSED SCHEME
This section presents a preliminary discussion on access
control, and then proposes a solution for preventing various
attacks in the SG. Our scheme (a) first, derives and identifies
the role of a user, and then verifies the identities of each user
and the device, (b) allows to have a symmetric secret key
at both ends (user and device) for secure communication
without transmitting the key to another end over the net-
work, (c) supports two-factor authentication to defeat MITM
and other attacks, (d) is applicable in dynamic environment
varying the number of users and devices in the SG network,
and (e) is verified with formal security proofs.
4.1 Preliminary Discussion on Access Control
An access control restricts a user to have a limited access
to resources according to its domain of interest and per-
missions. In RBAC, it is easy to audit users’ permissions
and the permissions granted to a user, whereas in attribute-
based access control (ABAC), it is more difficult to audit
users having resource access to the given permission and
the permissions granted to a given user. The reason is
that the ABAC uses a large number of attributes that re-
quires substantial understanding and manageability, and
these attributes do not have any meaning until they are
associated with an entity [42]. It would be advantageous
to combine both schemes together to provide flexibility,
auditability, scalability, understandability, and manageabil-
ity. A role-centric attribute-based access control (RABAC)
scheme proposed by Xin et al. [43] combines roles and
attributes to provide an access control in a reliable manner.
Moreover, role-centric and dynamic-role capabilities with
ABAC’s fine-grained access control are also being developed
and implemented for commercial purposes [44].
4.2 Basic Description of Our System and Assumptions
The proposed scheme provides a dynamic-role attribute-
based access control, where a role is formed based on
various attributes of an entity. Each user has a defined
role as RBAC registered at corresponding ASss, whereas
dynamic role of each user is computed using ABAC at each
device. A part of our proposed scheme is based on bilinear
map and pair-based cryptography [45], where the secret
keys generated at both ends have been proved equal. The
following are some basic assumptions made in this paper:
1. In case of physical access of the devices, a user in-
terface provides input/output to/from each device and is
capable of performing light computations on it.
2. The presented scenario is similar for IEDs, SMs, and
OFEs. The IEDs scenario can be easily extended to explain
scenarios with other types of devices.
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Fig. 4: Proposed scheme for remote access of the device.
3. Each user and the corresponding substation share the
user credential, i.e., user identity and password.
4. The communication channel between a device and a
server is secure, as the devices are always connected with
the respective substations.
Our proposed scheme is based on the bilinear pairing
technique. Let G1 be an additive group and G2 be a mul-
tiplicative group on a symmetric pairing function e. Both
groups are of order q, where q is a large prime. Let P
be an arbitrary generator of G1. Assume that the discrete
logarithm problem (DLP) is hard in both G1 and G2.
Definition: A bilinear pairing on (G1, G2) is a map e :
G1 × G1 → G2 that satisfies the following properties of the
cryptographic bilinear map:
Properties: (1) Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(bP, aQ) = e(abP,Q)
= e(P, abQ) = e(P,Q)ab; ∀ a, b ∈ Z∗q , and ∀ P,Q ∈ G1
(2) Non-degeneracy: e(P, P ) 6= 1
(3) Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to com-
pute e(P,Q) for ∀P,Q ∈ G1.
Here, given P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G1, and a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , it is easy
to verify whether c = ab mod q, however, it is difficult to
compute abP . The group G1 is called a gap Diffie-Hellman
(DH) group [46].
4.3 A New Generic Design of Proposed Scheme
Our proposed scheme has four subsections: (i) initial setup,
(ii) identity creation, (iii) accessing device, and (iv) verifica-
tion of the identities.
i) Initial Setup: Let G, GT be two cyclic groups of the
same prime order q, and P be a generator of group G.
Suppose G and GT are equipped with a pairing, i.e., a
non-degenerated and efficiently computable bilinear map
e : G×G→ GT such that e(P, P ) 6= 1GT and e(aP1, bQ1) =
e(bP1, aQ1) = e(P1, Q1)
ab ∈ GT for all a, b ∈ Z∗q and any
P1, Q1 ∈ G. Central station and all substations agree on an
elliptic curve over a finite field E(Fq). Note that the elliptic
curves are more efficient than finite fields and make pairings
even more useful in terms of space and time [47]. Further,
IDss ∈ Z∗q is an identity of the substation (SS) while public
key of the substation is Y2ss = IDssP . We refer to [48] for a
more comprehensive description of pairing assumptions.
ii) Identity Creation: We assume that the identity of
each substation IDss is publicly known. Each day, each
substation’s authentication server ASss chooses a random
private key xss ∈ Z∗q . Similarly, each MP selects a new
random private key xmp ∈ Z∗q and generates its public
identity in a group (substation) as Gmp=xmpP . The MP
requests to the AS
′
ss (under which it is registered) for the
verification of its public identity. It submits Gmp to the AS
′
ss,
and the AS
′
ss verifies whether any other registered MP has
the same identity. If yes, the requested MP needs to change
its public identity. The chances of selecting the same xmp by
two MPs are very rare because q is a very large prime. The
AS
′
ss returns a temporary identity as TIDss−mp=xssGmp
to the MP. The AS
′
ss also stores TIDss−mp in its database
in addition to the details of the MP, such as name of the
person (Name), role of the person (Role), identity of the
person (IDmp), and contact number (Mobno) in order to
send OTP for verification (two-factor authentication). The
MP can use this TIDss−mp for accessing devices under
different substations for certain duration per session and
per substation. Note that the secret key and the temporary
identity of the user are only valid for a short period and are
removed from the AS
′
ss’s database after its use. However,
each AS
′
ss maintains a daily report containing the details
of the accessed devices (IDied, ID
′
ss, type of device) by
the MPs. The request for generating a temporary identity
can be completed either by physically at substations or via
remotely using its login credentials to the AS
′
ss.
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iii) Accessing Device: This subsection describes the steps
for accessing devices remotely as well as physically.
a) Remote Access of Device: Each step of remote access
scheme, as illustrated in Figure 4, is explained as follows:
Step-1: First, the MP generates a public key
pair Y1mp=xmpH1, Y2mp=IDssY1mp , and a SS−MP
compatible public key as Y2ss−mp=xmpY2ss . Note
that Y1 and Y2 both are public parameters. Here,
H1=H(mode, department, location, SDP) and IDss is the
identity of the substation to which the device is registered,
and SDP is secret device parameter. Then, the MP
sends message-1 {Gmp, ID
′
ss,Attributes, Y2mp , Y1mp , T1}
to the IED/SM/OFE where Attributes are mode of access,
department, location, and SDP, T1 is a timestamp value
at the time of message creation, and ID
′
ss is the identity
of substation to which the MP is registered. Location
information is unique for each device. Note that the MP
needs to provide location information of the device for the
remote access of the device. Otherwise, the location of the
device will be used as the location of the MP in case of
physical access. For the remote access, the MP also includes
a one-way hash value H2 along with message-1, where
H2=H(Gmp, ID
′
ss,Attributes, Y2mp , Y1mp , T1) for ensuring
the integrity of message over the network.
Step-2: On receiving message-1, the IED com-
putes H
′
2=H(Gmp, ID
′
ss,Attributes, Y2mp , Y1mp , T1) and ver-
ifies H2
?
= H
′
2. If both are equal, the integrity
of message-1 is successfully verified. Otherwise, the
connection is terminated. Then, the IED computes
H
′
1=H(mode, department, location, SDP), its public identity
in the group (substation) as Gied=xiedP using its pri-
vate key xied ∈ Z∗q , a public key pair Y1ied=xiedH1
and Y2ied=IDssY1ied , and a SS-IED compatible public key
Y2ss−ied=xiedY2ss . The computation of H
′
1 always requires
the location information supplied by the device itself, not
by the MP during physical or remote access of the device.
Then, the role of a user is computed by the IED by matching
the value of H
′
1 with the stored role values, i.e., cRole
?
=
H
′
1. Further, the IED also verifies the identity of the MP
by sending message-2 {Gmp, ID
′
ss, IDied, Y2ss−ied , S, T2, h}
using a secure channel to the respective ASss to which
the device belongs. Here, S=IDiedh+IDiedGied, and
h=H(Gmp, ID
′
ss, IDied, Y2ss−ied , S, T2).
Step-3: On receiving message-2, the ASss first verifies the
identity of the device, i.e., IDied. The verification of IDied is
done in a batch mode. Once, IDied verification is over, the
ASss checks whether its IDss is same as the received ID
′
ss. If
they are different, the ASss passes {IDss, ID
′
ss, Gmp, IDied}
to the ASc in order to verify the identity of the user by
its registered server of the substation. This is done by
encrypting the message with a pre-shared key between
the ASss and the ASc. The ASc transmits the message {
IDss, ID
′
ss, Gmp, IDied} to the corresponding AS
′
ss having
identity ID
′
ss encrypted with pre-shared key between the
AS
′
ss and the ASc. Thereafter, the AS
′
ss verifies TIDss−mp
using the received Gmp and its xss, and sends response
{Name, Role, SS} back to the ASss via ASc by a secure chan-
nel, where SS is the name of the AS
′
ss to which MP belongs.
If IDss
?
= ID
′
ss, it means the MP belongs to the IDss, so the
ASss itself handles TIDss−mp verification and report gener-
ation. We perform a simple verification of TIDss−mp to im-
prove the system efficiency. Furthermore, an OTP is sent to
the MP for verifying its identity. This OTP can be sent using
EasySMS that provides end-to-end security to the SMS over
the network [49]. If the two-factor verification is successful,
the ASss sends message-3 {Name,Role, SS, T3,OTP, H3} to
the IED, where H3=H(Name,Role, SS, T3,OTP). Otherwise,
the connection is discarded.
Step-4: After receiving message-3, the IED computes
and verifies H3
?
= H
′
3. If it is true, the IED also checks
cRole ?=Role. If it is also true, the IED transmits message-
4 {EK{Name,Role, SS}, T4, Y1ied , Y2ied , H4} to the MP,
where H4=H(EK{Name,Role, SS}, T4, Y1ied , Y2ied ). Here, E
denotes the encryption that can be performed using the
MAES algorithm [49], which generates a ciphertext of 158
characters (1111 bits) from a plaintext of 160 characters
(1120 bits). Hence, this encryption will maintain the system
efficiency almost as it is. The secret key Kied, used in MAES,
is generated at IED and is expanded from 128 to 256 bits
using an expand function and an OTP. The MP computes
and compares H4
?
= H
′
4. If it is true, the MP computes
a secret key Kmp, decrypts the message, verifies its role,
and performs actions based on an authorized role. Note
that the secret keys generated at IED and MP are same, i.e.,
Kied=Kmp (Theorem-1 in sec. 5.1). Hence, this secret shared
key (say K) is used for encrypting message-4. Now, the MP
can directly access the device using the shared key until its
expiry time. Here, the expiry time of the key is a session
time, and the access time per role per attempt is a sub-
session time within a session. For example, if the working
shift is about 8 hours, then the key expiry time (session
time) may configure to be 4 hours, the user can access the
device multiple times (per sub-session) depending on the
role specified for each type of user. For read-only access
users, the sub-session time may configure to be 5 sec. (s).
b) Physical Access of Device: Note that in case of the
physical access, as shown in Figure 5, the device uses its
own default location for computing hash value. The times-
tamp values T1 and T4 are not required for the physical
access, as input (set of parameters) is acquired on-site. Also,
H2 and H4 do not need to be computed.
iv) Verification of the Identities of IED and MP: Since the
maintenance work is generally scheduled in advance and is
done at regular intervals, the verification of user and device
identities by the authentication server in a batch would be
more efficient during that period. In an emergency situation,
a one-to-one maintenance service can be provided to any
device. Here, we focus on an efficient batch verification of
identities of the devices as shown in Figure 6.
All IEDi (i = 1, 2, 3,..., m; m = number of IEDs
requested for verification to the server at one time)
send message-2 {Gmpi , ID
′
ssi , IDiedi , Y2ss−iedi , Si, Ti, hi}
to the ASssi . Here, Si=IDiedihi+IDiediGiedi and
hi=H(Gmpi , ID
′
ssi , IDiedi , Y2ss−iedi , Si, Ti). On receiving
message-2, the ASssi computes s=
∑m
i Si and X=sIDssi ,
and compares
∑m
i=1[IDiedi(Y2ss−iedi + hiIDssi)]
?
= X ,
where IDssi is the identity of the ASssi . If it is false,
indicating that one or more IEDi are malicious, the ASssi
terminates the connection for each invalid request. Then, it
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Fig. 5: Proposed scheme for physical access of the device.
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Fig. 6: Verification of device and user identities.
identifies and removes the malicious IEDi from the batch
using an algorithm presented in [50]. Thereafter, it again
performs a batch verification for all valid IEDi and checks∑m
i=1[IDiedi(Y2ss−iedi + hiIDssi)]
?
= X . The ASssi checks
IDss′i from the message received by each verified IEDi.
If IDss′i
?
= IDssi , the MP belongs to this particular ASssi .
Otherwise, the encrypted {Gmpi , IDssi , IDss′i , IDiedi} is
forwarded to the corresponding ASss′i via ASc. The ASc
keeps the information regarding the identities and names
of all substations. Thereafter, the ASss′i verifies TIDss−mpi
and sends response {Namei, Rolei, SS
′
i} back to the ASssi
via ASc. Upon verification, the ASssi sends message-3
{Namei,Rolei, SSi, Tj ,OTPi, H3i} to all valid IEDi. The
process of verifying
∑m
i=1[IDiedi(Y2ss−iedi + hiIDssi)]
?
= X
is illustrated in Figure 7, where for simplicity, we have
omitted IDss′i and Ti. We assume that IDssi=IDss
′
i
,
hence, ASssi=ASss′i and SSi=SS
′
i. Consider two IEDs,
i.e., IED1 and IED2 that send message-2 to the ASss






1 1 1 2 2 2   
Gmp1,	IDied1,	Y2ssied1,	S1,	h1 Gmp2,	IDied2,	Y2ssied2,	S2,	h2
Fig. 7: An example for identities and roles verification.
at the same time. The message received by the ASss
from the IED1 is {Gmp1 , IDied1 , Y2ss−ied1 , S1, h1} while
message from the IED2 is {Gmp2 , IDied2 , Y2ss−ied2 , S2, h2}.
On receiving, the ASss computes and compares∑m
i=1[IDiedi(Y2ss−iedi + hiIDssi)]
?
= X . In order to
verify the identity of each MP, the ASss first computes
TID
′
ss−mpi=xssGmpi from the received Gmpi and compares
it with the stored TIDss−mpi . If it is true, the identity of the
user is verified successfully. The proposed scheme can be
applied with any other user-role, such as customer, vendor
engineer, contractor, and etc.
5 SECURITY PROOFS, ANALYSIS, AND PERFOR-
MANCE EVALUATION
This section presents computation proofs in the scheme, and
security and performance analysis of the proposed scheme.
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5.1 Computation Proofs
This subsection derives the computational proofs for the
statements used in the proposed scheme.
Theorem 1. The proposed scheme generates a shared
secret key at MP and IED.
Proof: Generation of a Shared Secret Key at MP and IED: In
order to generate same key at both ends, the MP computes
OTPmp = Y2ss−mpOTP and generates Kmp whereas the IED
computes OTPied = GiedOTP and generates Kied.
Kmp = e(Y2ied , Gmp)e(Y1ied ,OTPmp)
= e(Y2ied , Gmp)e(Y1ied , Y2ss−mpOTP)
= e(IDssY1ied , xmpP )e(xiedH1, xmpY2ssOTP)
= e(xiedIDssH1, xmpP )e(xiedH1, xmpIDssP.OTP)
= e(xmpH1, xiedIDssP )e(xmpIDssH1, xiedP.OTP)
since{e(aP, bQ) = e(bP, aQ)}
= e(Y1mp , Y2ss−ied)e(Y1mp IDss, GiedOTP)
= e(Y1mp , Y2ss−ied)e(Y2mp ,OTPied)
= Kied
In a similar way, each IED can generate a shared secret
key with other users.
Theorem 2. If all the requests are made by the legitimate
MPs to various IEDs, the ASss verifies all the requests
correctly.
Proof: Batch Verification at ASss:
R.H.S. = X
= sIDssi
= IDss[(IDied1h1 + IDied1Gied1)
+ (IDied2h2 + IDied2Gied2)]
= IDss[(IDied1Gied1 + IDied2Gied2)
+ (IDied1h1 + IDied2h2)]
L.H.S. =
m∑
i=1
[IDiedi(Y2ss−iedi + hiIDssi)]
= IDied1Y2ss−ied1 + IDied2Y2ss−ied2
+ IDss[IDied1h1 + IDied2h2]
= IDied1xied1 IDssP + IDied2xied2IDssP
+ IDss[IDied1h1 + IDied2h2]
= IDss[IDied1xied1P + IDied2xied2P ]
+ IDss[IDied1h1 + IDied2h2]
= IDss[(IDied1Gied1 + IDied2Gied2)
+ (IDied1h1 + IDied2h2)]
Hence,
∑m
i=1[IDiedi(Y2ss−iedi + hiIDssi)]
?
= X is true.
5.2 Security Analysis
In this subsection, authentication, session key establishment,
and privacy preservation are discussed along with preven-
tion against different attacks.
i) Mutual Authentication: A mutual authentication is pro-
vided between the user, i.e., MP, and the server, i.e., ASss.
The ASss authenticates the MP by verifying TIDss−mp
?
=
xssGmp, and each MP authenticates the AS by comparing
its name, role, and substation name with the received infor-
mation, i.e., Name, Role, and SS. Note the Gmp is used only
once. Further, we used two-factor authentication where an
OTP is sent to the user. Adversary A cannot verify OTP.
ii) Session Key Establishment: Each Kmp/Kied key is used
as a session shared secret key for each authentication be-
tween the user MP and the device IED. The same key is
used for a session within the expiry time.
iii) Privacy Preservation: The privacy of each MP is well
protected during the authentication over the network. The
TIDss−mp is computed by the ASss and is assigned to
the MP. The intermediate operators and operator at ASss
cannot identify the actual MP by viewing Gmp, as a random
number xss is selected by the server as private key, which
is securely stored in the database of ASss considering the
fact that operator at server cannot access master table of the
database. The IEDs also cannot identify the MP. Hence, an
attacker cannot retrieve actual MP’s identity by forging the
IED or by traffic analysis over the network. Since, TIDss−mp
of the MP changes for each session, the adversary cannot
gain useful information from a long term analysis.
iv) Integrity Protection: The proposed scheme provides
integrity protection by using hash functions on each trans-
mitted message over the network. If an adversary A in-
tentionally changes any transmitted parameter (including
public key), the received and computed hash values will
not match at receiver and the connection will be terminated.
v) Prevention Against Various Attacks: The proposed
scheme defeats the following security attacks:
a. Impersonation Attack: A needs to know the temporary
identity and secret key of the victim user assigned by
the server. However, A cannot obtain secret key without
knowing its parameters to generate. A different key pair
is used at each device to prevent the use of old parameter
values in other devices. There are two possible cases for an
impersonation attack as follows:
• Case-1: A impersonates the MP: (1) A changes Gmp
as AGmp. On receiving message-1, the IED finds
H2 6= H ′2, and hence terminates the connection.
(2) A sends a fake Gmp as AGmp with a new hash
AH2. On receiving the message, the ASss verifies re-
ceived AGmp with the stored Gmp’s in the database.
As, AGmp 6= Gmp, the AS rejects the request.
• Case-2: A impersonates the IED: If A tries to imperson-
ate the IED, the identity and signature of the device
are verified by the ASss. In this case, the signature
would be different and identity of the device will not
match. Hence, the connection will be terminated.
b. MITM Attack: A packet or message sniffing allows A
to capture the message information over the network. Once
the information is captured,A can gain access to the system.
For a MITM, A tries to build a connection between both the
involved parties. There are two possible cases as follows:
• Case-1: Key-exchange by adversary A: Consider A is
located between the MP and the IED. Since (Y1mp ,
Y2mp ) and (Y1ied , Y2ied ) are being sent in plaintext
over the network, A may try to learn secret key.
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However, OTPmp and OTPied are not sent over the
network, and Y2ss−ied is sent over a secure network.
A does not know Gied and the actual identity of the
MP. Therefore,A cannot generate secret key and also
cannot trace MP’s identity.
• Case-2: Adversary A as a rogue device: A may install a
fake device in place of a legitimate device. In such a
case, A can extract the information provided by the
user to the device and can later use that information
to access the system from a valid device’s interface.
In order to protect such access, after receiving the
message from the device, the ASss sends an OTP to
the user in order to verify its identity. Hence, two-
factor authentication takes place, one by matching
TIDss−mp and other by sending an OTP.
• Case-3: Adversary A tries to extract information from
the message: A may try to extract some information
from message-4 that is being sent over the network.
A cannot decrypt the message as it is not able to
generate the secret key.
c. Replay and Injection Attacks: A can intercept a message
in order to perform a replay attack. It can also inject message
information during communication over the network. The
proposed scheme can resist replay attacks by using times-
tamp values Ti in all transmitted messages, and also xmp,
xied, xss, OTP are chosen randomly in each session. There
can be three different cases under this scenario as follows:
• Case-1: MP replay and injection attacks: (1) A captures
and later sends message-1 to the IED. On receiv-
ing the message, the IED detects that message-1
was resent, as the received timestamp T1 is out-
dated. The message is considered valid only when
T1 + Tthreshold ≤ Tcurrent, where Tthreshold is a
threshold timestamp that is a maximum time con-
sidered for reaching a message from one entity to
another. Hence, the connection is terminated.
(2) A sends message-1 to the IED with a new times-
tamp AT1 and a new hash AH2. The IED forwards
the message to the ASss for identity verification of
the MP. The ASss checks the identity of the MP and
finds a mismatch between the received MP’s identity
and the stored identities of all the MPs. Hence, the
connection is terminated.
• Case-2: ASss replay and injection attacks: (1) When A
replays message-3 to the IED, it checks timestamp
validity. If it is not valid, the IED refuses the message.
(2) Message-3 is sent with a new AT3 and new AH3,
then the IED computes user-role and compares the
role received from the ASss. As A’s role will be
different, the IED terminates the connection.
• Case-3: IED replay and injection attacks: (1)AIED sends
message-2 as a replay to the ASss, the ASss verifies
timestamp validity. As it is outdated, the ASss dis-
cards the request. The same case applies when the
IED sends a replay message-4 to the MP.
(2) A modifies T2 of the message-2 to a new AT2
and sends to the ASss. On receiving, the ASss finds
h 6= h′ , and terminates the connection. The same case
applies when A sends message-4 to the MP.
(3) A injects a new AT2 as well as a new Ah
in message-2 and sends it to the ASss. The ASss
compares Gmp with the stored Gmp’s. Since it is an
invalid Gmp, the ASss discards the request. Even ifA
modifies IDied, the connection is terminated, as ASss
fails to verify received signature of the device.
(4) A injects AT4 and AH4 to the message-4. How-
ever, A fails to generate the secret key shared be-
tween the MP and the IED. As a result, the message
cannot not be decrypted correctly by MP’s secret key.
d. Redirection Attack: Each time when a new user tries
to access a device, it has to provide location information
to the device. Thereafter, the device verifies its location
by computing and comparing H2
?
= H
′
2. This helps to
detect redirection attacks in the SG system. We illustrate this
scenario by the following two cases:
• Case-1: MP redirection attack: If A provides wrong
location in message-1, on receiving the message, the
IED verifies H2 6= H ′2 and refuses the message. The
IED finds a mismatch between location information
received from A and its stored information. Hence,
the IED terminates the connection.
• Case-2: IED redirection attack: A can also send
message-2 with a fake AIDied and ID
′
ss. If the ID
′
ss
in message-2 is same as the communicated IDss, the
ASss verifies AIDied, otherwise it sends the message
to the ASc for verification. Since it is a fake AIDied,
the ASc finds it invalid. As a result, the ASc termi-
nates the connection.
e. Attacks by the Consumer/Operator/Maintenance Personnel:
The customer and maintenance personnel have read-only
user-roles belonging to different departments, hence they
cannot extract/modify other information. An operator (in-
sider) cannot extract the actual identity of the user (IDmp)
from the received identity (in a substation group), i.e., Gmp,
over the network, as the identity changes after each session.
f. Other Attacks: Our scheme prevents the SG system
against Known Key Attack. The server of the substation
cannot generate the next session user’s public identity Gmp
from the previous one. Further, for each session key gener-
ation, private key xmp is different and the public identity
of each user is newly generated for each session at each
device. The identity and signature verification used in the
scheme prevent Repudiation Attack. A user can modify (or
even access) the system only after the user authentication
and authorization verification. Hence, a malicious user or
attacker cannot Change the Security Parameters of the device.
5.3 Performance Analysis
Consider a SG network scenario with an authentication
server remotely connected with various devices. The spec-
ification of the PC system is 1.70 GHz Core i3-4005U CPU
with 4GB RAM and 500GB drive. We performed IEC61850
Client/Server IED simulation on a PC with The SmartGrid-
ware Java IEC61850 Client/Server SDK [40]. Furthermore,
the performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated in
terms of communication and computation overheads. We
compare our scheme with the schemes presented in [39] and
[35] because these are only comparable work that consider
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user/device-server authentication while accessing a device.
However, these schemes use a password for each user-role.
i) Communication Overhead: In order to reduce commu-
nication overhead, the MP is assigned for accessing the
devices from the same substation whenever is possible.
Communication overhead is the total number of bits trans-
mitted over the network during protocol/scheme/approach
execution. Total communication overhead of our scheme is
as follows:
Message-1: Gmp(128) + Attributes(64) + ID
′
ss(128) + Y2mp (128)
+ Y1mp (128) + T1(64) + H2(64) = 704 bits,
Message-2: Gmp(128) + ID
′
ss(128) + IDied(128) + Y2ss−ied (128)
+ S(128) + T2(64) + h(64) = 768 bits,
Message-3: Name(128) + Role(128) + SS(64) + T3(64) + OTP(3)
+ H3(64) = 451 bits,
Message-4: Name(128) + cRole(128) + SS(64) + T3(64) +
Y2ied (128) + Y1ied (128) + H4(64) = 704 bits,
Total overhead = 2627 bits (328.375 bytes).
As shown in Table 4, the overheads of our scheme
between the MP-IED and the IED-AS are 1408 bits and 1219
bits, respectively. The total communication overhead of our
scheme is lower than the scheme [39] adding integrity check
and timestamp values, as well as scheme [35]. We assume
that there are m-number of MPs that are accessing different
devices within a substation simultaneously. In this case, the
total communication overhead (for the first attempt) of our
scheme, scheme [39], and scheme [35] would be 2627×m,
2752×m, and 2944×m, respectively. Further, we assume that
r-number of attempts are allowed for accessing the same
device within a session. For any subsequent authentica-
tion, our scheme generates 256×r communication overhead
(since we use MAES with 256 bits of block size sending
mode, location, department, SDP in encrypted form), while
scheme [39] and scheme [35] produce 2752×r and 2944×r,
respectively. As shown in Figure 8, our scheme is able to
provide authorization and authentication to different MPs
accessing different devices without increasing the overhead.
ii) Computation Overhead: We assume the operation under
multiplication group as M , pairing function as P , hash
function as H , operation under addition group (addition)
as A, subtraction as S, encryption as E, decryption as D,
probability generation function as Gen, signature as Sig,
key generation KG, message authentication code as MAC,
verification function as Ver, reproduction algorithm as Rep,
user credential generation asC, device credential generation
as DE, and authentication server credential generation as
TABLE 4: Communication Overhead (in bits)
Schemes User Reg-
istration
User-
Device
Device-
Server
Total
Proposed
Scheme
– 1408
(MP−IED)
1219
(IED−AS)
2627
Scheme [39]
with integrity
& timestamp
832
(UA−TA)
960
(UA−SSC)
960
(SSC−IED)
2752
Scheme [35] 1664
(C−AS)
– 1280
(D−AS)
2944
AG. We compute the overhead for a single MP scheme run
at MP, IED, and AS as presented in Table 5.
The total computation overhead of scheme [39] with
integrity and timestamp values, and scheme [35] are 14M ,
21H , 12A, 1S and 2Sig, 4E, 4D, 2Ver, 2KG, 4H , 2Gen, 2MAC,
1S, 1Rep, 3AG, 5C, 5DE, respectively, while for our scheme
it is 1P , 14M , 9H , 2A, 1E, 1D. If we assume a unit value
for each operation, then we can say that our scheme is
efficient than schemes in [39] and [35], as the total number
of computations (operations) performed by our scheme is
29, while it is 48 and 37 for the schemes in [39] and [35],
respectively. The actual computation time by each scheme
depends upon the actual time taken by each operation.
Furthermore, for multiple authentications scenario, scheme
[39], scheme [35], and our scheme generate 48×m, 37×m,
and 30×m-1 computation overhead, respectively, as shown
in Figure 9 assuming a unit value for each function.
iii) Discussion: In order to measure time required for
computing and checking the user-role, we implemented H1
as SHA256 function on Intel i3, Window7 in Java, which
took 20 milliseconds (ms). In order to implement pairing
function, we converted a hash string to an octet string and
then an elliptic curve point [54]. A pairing function using J-
pairing is performed in 197 ms, while it took 246 ms for all
multiplications (scalar and elliptic curve). Further, hashing,
addition, subtraction, AES encryption and decryption took
20 ms, 0.03 ms, 0.03 ms, 0.23 ms, and 0.13 ms, respectively.
The average mobile broadband download speed on 4G (15.1
Mbit/s) is more than twice as fast as 3G (6.1 Mbit/s) [51].
Our scheme takes 0.45 ms on 3G network while 0.18 ms
on 4G network to transmit all 4-messages over the network.
Overall, the execution time for our scheme is 0.62 s while
it is 0.67 s for the scheme in [39]. The structures of various
functions are not defined in scheme [35]. Therefore, it is not
possible to compute total execution time of the scheme.
To better demonstrate the advantage of our scheme, we
also conduct simulations in Java in comparison with two
separate authentication and authorization schemes instead
of our authentication and authorization scheme. Consid-
ering two schemes instead of one require two separate
connections between MP-IED and IED-AS by each user.
Here, the user needs to generate two temporary identities,
respectively, for during authentication and during autho-
rization. Also, since the computed roles H1 at MP and IED
are used in Y1mp and Y1ied , respectively, and are later used
in computing the shared secret key for authentication, H1
TABLE 5: Computation Overhead
Schemes TA MP/UA IED AS/SSC
Proposed
Scheme
– 4M, 2H,
1D, 1P
6M, 5H,
1A, 1E
4M, 2H,
1A
Scheme [39]
with integrity
& timestamp
7M,
4H, 4A
4M, 8H,
5A, 1S
1M, 4H,
2A
2M, 5H,
1A
Scheme [35] – 2Gen, 1E,
1S, 1MAC,
1D, 1Rep,
5C, 2H
2D,
2Ver,
5DE
2Sig, 3E,
2KG, 1D,
2H, 3AG,
1MAC
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Fig. 9: Computation overhead for multiple MPs.
needs to be computed twice. We simulated these schemes
for 50 users belonging to the same authentication server
simultaneously accessing different devices. The connection
establishment time is 3216 ms for our scheme, and 3212 ms
and 2042 ms, respectively, for the separate authentication
and authorization schemes. On average, the execution time
per user is 3.83 s for our scheme, while 3.81 s and 2.08 s, re-
spectively, for the authentication scheme and authorization
scheme. Hence, since the two separate schemes take 5.89 s
in total, they are 35% slower than our scheme that executes
authentication and authorization simultaneously together.
6 FORMAL PROOF
This section presents the formal proof of the proposed
scheme using a well-known BAN-Logic [52] as well as au-
tomatic security verification tool named Proverif [53].
1) Security Proof using BAN-Logic: In order to justify
our analysis, we use BAN-Logic symbols to formally proof
our scheme. Notations of BAN-Logic can be followed in [52].
1) The formal messages in the proposed scheme:
(1) MPi→IEDi: ID′ssi , Attributes, Y2mpi , Y1mpi , Gmpi ,
T1i , H2i ; TIDss−mpi = xssGmpi ;
(2) IEDi→ASssi : ID
′
ssi , IDiedi , Gmpi , Y2ss−iedi , Si, T2i , hi;
(3) ASssi→IEDi: Namei, Rolei, SSi, OTPi, T3i , H3i ;
(4) IEDi→MPi: EK{Namei, cRolei, SSi}, T4i , H4i ;
cRolei=Rolei;
2) Security Assumption: The MP and the IED share a secret
key, i.e., Kmpi=Kiedi .
(1) MP has a secure key Kmpi and MPi|≡MPi
Kmpi↔ IEDi.
(2) IED has a secure key Kiedi and IEDi|≡IEDi
Kiedi↔ MPi.
3) Message Meaning Rule:
(1) MPi|≡(MPi
Kmpi↔ IEDi),MPi/TIDss−mpi
MPi|≡ASi|∼Gmpi
(2) IEDi|≡(IEDi
Kiedi↔ MPi),ASi/TIDss−mpi
ASi|≡MPi|∼Gmpi
4) Timestamp Verification Rule:
(1) MPi|≡#(Ti),MPi|≡ASi|∼GmpiMPi|≡ASi|≡Gmpi
(2) ASi|≡#(Tj),ASi|≡MPi|∼GmpiASi|≡MPi|≡Gmpi
5) Jurisdiction Rule:
(1) MPi|≡ASi⇒TIDss−mpi ,MPi/MPi|∼TIDss−mpiMPi|≡ASi
(2) ASi|≡MPi⇒TIDss−mpi ,ASi/ASi|∼TIDss−mpiASi|≡MPi
6) Protocol Goals:
a. Mutual Authentication: MPi|≡IEDi|≡ASi∧ASi|≡
IEDi|≡MPi→MPi|≡IEDi∧ASi. Thus, mutual
authentication holds.
b. Session Key Agreement: Each Ki key between each MPi
and the IEDi provides session key agreement.
c. Freshness of messages: ASi|≡#(Tj)∧MPi|≡#(Tj), Thus,
freshness of messages between MPi, IEDi, and ASi hold.
d. Integrity and Privacy between each MPi and the IEDi:
(1) MPi|≡(MPi
Kmpi↔ IEDi),MPi/H(Msg)
MPi|≡IEDi|∼Msg
(2) IEDi|≡(IEDi
Kiedi↔ MPi),MPi/TIDss−mpi
MPi|≡IEDi|∼Gmpi
2) Security Proof using Proverif: The following are the
input and output observed from the Proverif tool:
(* Public channel between the MP and the IED *)
free pubChannel : channel.
(* Secure channel between the IED and the SS *)
free secureChannel : channel [ private ].
(* types *)
type key. type ident. type nonce. type msgHdr.
type resp. type sessKey. type hash.
(* constant message headers *)
const MSG1,MSG2,MSG3,MSG4,CMC,MSG: msgHdr.
(* Functions *)
fun sha256 (nonce): hash.
fun sha3842 (ident,nonce,nonce,nonce,nonce,nonce): hash.
fun sha3844 (bitstring,nonce,nonce,nonce): hash.
fun sha3843 (nonce,hash,nonce,nonce): hash.
fun sha384h (ident,ident,nonce,nonce,nonce,nonce): hash.
fun tempid (nonce,key): ident.
fun findrole (hash,hash): hash.
fun e(nonce, nonce,nonce,nonce): sessKey.
fun cipherfun(nonce,hash,nonce): bitstring.
fun sencrypt (bitstring,sessKey): bitstring.
reduc forall m: bitstring, k: sessKey;
sdecrypt(sencrypt(m,k),k) = m.
(* Key table consists of pairs (ident,key) shared between
MP and SS. Table is not accessible by the attacker *)
free s: bitstring [ private ].
query attacker(s).
(* Ki is secret if and only if all Ki are secret *)
free Ki: sessKey [ private ].
query attacker(Ki).
not attacker(new xmp).
(* Authentication queries *)
event begIED(nonce,sessKey).
event endIED(nonce,sessKey).
event begMP(nonce,sessKey).
event endMP(nonce,sessKey).
event begIED(msgHdr). event endIED(msgHdr).
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event begMP(msgHdr). event endMP(msgHdr).
query x1: nonce, x2: sessKey;
event(endIED(x1,x2)) ==> event(begIED(x1,x2)).
event(endMP(x1,x2)) ==> event(begMP(x1,x2)).
event(endIED(MSG)) ==> event(begIED(MSG)).
event(endMP(MSG)) ==> event(begMP(MSG)).
event enableEnc .
(* When the attacker knows s, the event enbleEnc has been
executed by attacker. *)
query attacker(s) ==> event(enableEnc).
let processMP =
(* The ident and pre-shared key of the MP *)
new IDmp: ident, xmp: key, Gmp: nonce, Y1mp : nonce, Y2mp :
nonce, Y2ss−mp : nonce, attr: nonce, T1: nonce;
new xss: key, Kimp : sessKey, IDss: ident, OTPmp: nonce;
let H2:hash=sha3842(IDss,attr,Y1mp ,Y2mp ,Gmp,T1) in
let H1: hash = sha256(attr) in
(** Note: compute Gmp, Y1mp , Y2mp , and Y2ss−mp **)
let TIDmp: ident = tempid(Gmp,xss) in
out (pubChannel,(MSG1,IDss,H2,attr,Y1mp ,Y2mp ,Gmp,T1));
event begIED(MSG4);
in(pubChannel,(=MSG4,cipher: bitstring,H44: hash,
Y2ied : nonce,Y1ied : nonce,T4: nonce));
let H4: hash = sha3844(cipher,T4,Y2ied ,Y1ied ) in
if H44 = H4 then
event endIED (MSG4);
(* Note: compute OTPmp after receiving OTP *)
let Kimp : sessKey = e(Y1ied ,Y2ied ,Gmp,OTPmp) in
in(pubChannel,(=CMC,enableEncmp: bool));
(** Note: verify cRole **)
event begMP(Gmp,Kimp );
(*Receive message from IED *)
in(pubChannel,(=MSG,cipher: bitstring));
let msgcontent: bitstring=sdecrypt(cipher,Kimp ) in 0.
out(pubChannel,sencrypt(msg1: bitstring,Kimp ));
if enableEncmp = true then
in(pubChannel,(=MSG,msg2: bitstring));
let msgcontent2: bitstring = sdecrypt(msg2,Kimp ) in 0.
event endMP(Gmp,Kimp );
let processIED =
new IDied: ident, xied: key, Gied: nonce, Y1ied : nonce,
OTPied: nonce, new Y2ied : nonce, Y2ss−ied : nonce;
new attr: nonce, T2: nonce, new T4: nonce, Kiied : sessKey,
H111: hash, S: nonce, cipher3: bitstring;
event begMP(MSG1);
in(pubChannel,(=MSG1,IDss:ident,H21:hash,attr1:nonce,
Y1mp1 : nonce,Y2mp1 : nonce,Gmp1: nonce,T11: nonce));
let H211: hash=sha3842(IDss1,attr1,Y1mp1 ,Y2mp1 ,Gmp1,T11)
in
if H21 = H211 then
event endMP(MSG1);
let H11: hash = sha256(attr1) in
let crole: hash = findrole(H11,H111) in
if H11 = H111 then
(** Note: compute Gied, Y1ied , Y2ied , Y2ss−ied , and S **)
let h: hash = sha384h(IDss1,IDied,Gmp1,Y2ss−ied ,S,T2) in
out(secureChannel,(MSG2,IDss1,IDied,Gmp1,Y2ss−ied ,S,
T2,h));
in(secureChannel,(=MSG3,name1: nonce,role1: hash,
SS1: nonce,OTP : nonce,T31: nonce,H31: hash));
let H311: hash = sha3843(name1,role1,SS1,T31, OTP ) in
if H31 = H311 then
if crole = role1 then
(** Note: compute OTPied **)
let Kiied : sessKey = e(Y1mp1 ,Y2mp1 ,OTPied,Y2ss−ied ) in
let cipher3 = cipherfun(name1,role1,SS1) in
let H4: hash = sha3844(cipher3,T4,Y2ied ,Y1ied ) in
out(pubChannel, (MSG4,cipher3,H4,Y2ied ,Y1ied ,T4));
(*IED encrypts messages and send to the MP*)
new enableEncied: bool, msg: bitstring;
event begIED(Gied,Kiied );
if enableEncied = false then
event enableEnc;
out(pubChannel,(MSG,s))
else
out(pubChannel,(MSG,sencrypt(s,Kiied )))
(*Send out cipher mode command *)
out(pubChannel,(CMC,enableEncied));
out(pubChannel,sencrypt(cipher3,Kiied ));
if enableEncied = true then
in(pubChannel,(=MSG,msg1: bitstring));
let msgcontent3: bitstring = sdecrypt(msg1,Kiied ) in 0.
out(pubChannel,sencrypt(msg2: bitstring,Kiied ));
event endIED(Gied,Kiied );
let processSS =
new name22: nonce, role22: hash, SS22: nonce;
new xss1: key, T3: nonce;
let H3: hash = sha3843 (name22,role22,SS22,T3) in
in(secureChannel,(=MSG2, IDss11: ident, IDied1: ident,
Gmp11: nonce, Y2ss−ied1 : nonce, S1: nonce, T21: nonce, h1:
hash));
let h11: hash = sha384h(IDss11,IDied1,Gmp11,Y2ss−ied1 , S1,
T21) in
if h1 = h11 then
(** Note: verify IDied and TIDss−mp **)
let TIDmp2 = tempid(Gmp11,xss1) in
let H3: hash = sha3843(name22,role22,SS22,T3,OTP ) in
out(secureChannel,(MSG3,name22,role22,SS22,OTP ,T3,
H3));
0.
process
((! processMP) | processIED | processSS)
Run & Output:
Neetesh@Neetesh-PC /proverif1.88
$ ./proverif examples/insiderattack.pv
–Query attacker(s[])==>event(enableEnc)
Completing...ok, secrecy assumption verified:
fact unreachable attacker (xmp[!1 = v 1037])
Starting query attacker(s[])==>event(enableEnc)
RESULT attacker(s[])==>event(enableEnc) is true.
–Query event(endMP(MSG1))==>event(begMP(MSG1))
Completing...ok, secrecy assumption verified:
fact unreachable attacker (xmp[!1=v 2164])
Starting query event(endMP(MSG1))==>
event(begMP(MSG1))
goal reachable: end(endMP(Gmp[!1=@sid 2344]))
Abbreviations: Gmp 2365=Gmp[!1=@sid 2363]
RESULT event(endMP(MSG1))==>
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event(begMP(MSG1)) is true.
–Query event(endIED(x1,x2 2488)) ==>
event(begIED(x1,x2 2488))
Completing...ok, secrecy assumption verified:
fact unreachable attacker (xmp[!1=v 3377])
Starting query event(endIED(x1,x2 2488))
==>event(begIED(x1,x2 2488)) goal reachable:
attacker(Y2ied 3600) && attacker(Y1ied 3601) &&
begin(begIED(Gmp[!1=@sid 3602],
Kimp [!1=@sid 3602]))− > end(endIED(Gmp[!1=@sid 3602],
e(Y1ied 3601, Y2ied 3600,
Gmp[!1=@sid 3602], Y2ss−mp [!1=@sid 3602])))
Abbreviations: Gmp 3622=Gmp[!1=@sid 3619]
Y2ss−mp 3623=Y2ss−mp [!1=@sid 3619]
Kimp 3624=Kimp [!1=@sid 3619]
RESULT event(endIED(x1,x2 2488))==>
event(begIED(x1,x2 2488)) is true.
–Query not attacker(Ki[])
Completing...ok, secrecy assumption verified:
fact unreachable attacker (xmp[!1=v 4614])
Starting query not attacker(Ki[])
RESULT not attacker(Ki[]) is true.
–Query not attacker(s[])
Completing...ok, secrecy assumption verified:
fact unreachable attacker (xmp[!1=v 5650])
Starting query not attacker(s[])
RESULT not attacker(s[]) is true.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a user authentication and autho-
rization scheme for accessing many different types devices
in the SG. Our scheme can be easily applied to different
user-roles, such as auditors, operators, and etc., who access
different devices in the SG system, as each user-role is com-
puted dynamically based on attribute-based access control
using a SHA256 hash function with (mode of access, depart-
ment, location, SDP) attributes provided by each user. Our
scheme enables two-factor authentication so that a rogue
device could not re-use the previous captured information
of a legitimate user. A bilinear pairing cryptography-based
shared secret key is generated between the user and the
device for further secure communications within a session.
The proposed scheme is efficient in terms of both, communi-
cation and computation overheads in comparison with the
existing schemes, and is able to defeat many well-known
outsider attacks as well as insider attacks. The correctness
of the proposed scheme is confirmed by the formal proof
with BAN-Logic as well as by Proverif.
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